MILF's perspective: On peace negotiation

By Robert Muhammad Maulana Alonto
Member of the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel
(Speech delivered during the 5th Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Movement conference at MSU main campus; December 14, 2008)

In behalf of Brother Muhaghir Iqbal, chair of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace panel, let me thank Prof. Al Senturias and the Mindanao People’s Peace Movement for inviting the MILF to this 5th Mindanao People’s Summit anchored on the theme: “Advancing the Democratic and Peaceful Options for Peace in Mindanao.”

We are also very much appreciate the Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao of Mindanao State University (MSU) under its director, Dr. Moctar Matuan, for providing the venue and the facilities for this significant forum.

Before I begin the task that has been requested of me by our brothers in the MILF peace panel and the Central Committee of the MILF, I would like to extend to you the apologies of Brother Iqbal , who much as he wanted to, could not attend this significant occasion for reasons of security, apart from other compelling factors, given the situation that the MILF and the Bangsamoro people are facing today.

To confess to you, I was just informed a couple of days ago that I would be delivering for him the message to this gathering and so I was a bit caught unprepared for this task considering the little time given to me. Be that as it may, it is both an honor and a pleasure to be representing Brother Iqbal as well as an honor and a pleasure to share with you the MILF’s perspective on, and experiences in, the peace negotiations with the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).

I shall do so very briefly.

It was 11 years ago- in 1977 – that the MILF first agreed to negotiate with and subsequently engage the GRP in dialogues on the negotiating table. There was only one primordial agenda: to solve the Bangsamoro problem.

It has to be understood and emphasized repeatedly that the MILF agreed to negotiate with the GRP because it sincerely believes that the Bangsamoro problem should and could be resolved through a negotiated political settlement. This conviction, on many occassiona, was articulated by the late Amirul Mujahideen and chairman of the MILF, Sheik Salamat Hashim (ra), and which become the official stand of the MILF that is upheld and continued until now by his successor, Amirul Mujahideen Al Haj Murad Ebrahim.

To place it in proper context, the Bangsamoro problem is a political problem. It is a political problem that finds its roots way back to the Spanish and American colonial periods when the once-sovereign and independent Bangsamoro people under the Moro sultanates found themselves caught in the raging tempest of colonial and imperial wars of the conquest unleashed upon them and on the rest of the peoples and the nations of the Third World. I need not elaborate to you the long history of the anti-colonial resistance struggle of our people against these foreign powers. Many of you are already familiar with it. Suffice to say that the anti-colonial struggle of our Moro forebears during those times continued down to the generations, and what we now know as the Bangsamoro problem is the current chapter of that anti-colonial struggle. This time, however, Spanish colonialism and American imperialism had been physically replaced by their spawn, Philippine colonialism, which saw the light of day in 1935 and grew into maturity in 1946.

As mentioned, the Bangsamoro problem is a political problem. To further elaborate on this, it is what is known in the current language of the world of conflict resolution as a sovereignty-based conflict. It involves two principles held by the parties to the conflict as sacrosanct. And these two principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity; on the other hand is the Bangsamoro people’s equally sacrosanct right of self determination and freedom.

It is these two principles on a collision course that underpin the armed conflict which engendered the ‘state of unpeace’ that we find ourselves in now. This is the Bangsamoro problem which the MILF and the GRP sought to resolve peacefully on the negotiating table when they began holding the peace talks in 1997 and then again in 2001.

Negotiation, particularly peace negotiation between two parties in conflict, is essentially a process to settle disputes through compromise in order to arrive at a solution that can best be described as a win-win outcome for all. The key word here is compromise. For without compromise by both parties to the conflict, a peaceful settlement is well-nigh impossible.

Thus it was that when the MILF and the GRP agreed to sit down and talk to settle the Bangsamoro Problem, the first act of both parties in 1997 was to compromise. The compromise was that the GRP agreed to the proposition that the peace negotiation would not be within the framework of the Philippine Constitution; on its part, the MILF conceded to the demand that it would not raise nor table as an immediate agenda the issue of Moro independence.

Both the MILF and the GRP saw fit to enter into this compromise not only because of the bitter lessons learned from the previous negotiations between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) but also because of that foresight to free the negotiations of any constrictive parameters that would restrict or inhibit the parties to the conflict from looking at new formulas and paradigms to solve the Bangsamoro problem, a problem that involves two colliding principles, a problem that predates the Philippine nation-state and thus all of its constitutions from 1935 to 1987.

This compromise, which was an unwritten ‘gentlemen’s agreement,’ was reaffirmed by both parties to the conflict when peace negotiations, which were interrupted by the Estrada all-out war in 2000, resumed in 2001.

It should not take anyone by surprise, therefore, why the MILF-GRP Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 does not refer to the Philippine Constitution as the framework for negotiation nor does it talk of Moro Independence. Instead, one finds international humanitarian law as term of reference in the Agreement and the usage of the generic word ‘freedom’ instead of independence and even in lieu of the term ‘right of self-determination.’

In any case, for 11 long years—years interspersed with infractions of the ceasefire truce on the ground, deadlocks in the talks, and two all-out wars—the MILF and the GRP peace panels painstakingly labored on the negotiating table searching for, debating on and eventually crafting the right formula to end the conflict in Mindanao bearing in mind the compromise that the two parties had committed themselves to at the start of the negotiations. Towards this end, the last four years—or three years and 8 months to be exact—of those 11 years were tediously devoted to giving flesh and soul to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, which is the political aspect and therefore the ‘meat’ of the 2001 MILF-GRP Tripoli Agreement on Peace.

The end-result of this laborious work in Malaysia, which acted as the chief facilitator to the negotiations and the venue of the talks since 200, is the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain or the MOA-AD.

The MOA-AD was formulated as the framework agreement for the last phase of the peace negotiations, which is the negotiation on the Comprehensive Political Compact. As a framework agreement, the MOA-AD was designed to satisfy the compromise between the MILF and the GRP. As such, it was the best formulation that the parties could come up with to resolve and end the conflict between the Philippine nation-state’s principle of ‘national sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and the Bangsamoro people’s right of self-determination.

The MOA-AD does not speak of the Philippine Constituion; but neither does it speak of Moro independence. What is envisaged is a sub-state for the Bangsamoro people—the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)—within the larger state of the Philippine nation state characterized by an associative relationship to start off the long process of rectifying the historical and current injustices committed against the Moros but without resorting to separation.

Unfortunately, the MOA-AD, which was initialed by all the parties to the agreement on July 27, 2008 and was slated to be formally signed in Kuala Lumpur on August 5, 2008, was ‘killed’ by the Philippine Supreme Court by way of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on the eve of the signing ceremony, and then was subsequently ‘buried’ by the same Supreme Court through a final decision on its unconstitutionality penned in October 14.

Most of you already know or are familiar with the sequence of events that followed the aborted signing of the MOA-AD. But for the sake of refreshing our memories, let me quickly rehearse to you the highlights of those events.

When the MOA-AD was leaked to the media by the GRP even before the aborted signing in August 5 took place, a storm of anti-Moro and anti-MILF hate campaign was gradually and deliberately being built up throughout the country. This hate-campaign intensified after the MOA-AD was aborted that saw the demonization of the MILF and the Bangsamoro people so much so that even those who claimed to be our friends among the Filipinos, except for a handful, distanced themselves from us and even joined the national chorus that denounced the MOA-AD as ‘unconstitutional’ and therefore unacceptable to the Filipino nation.

This ugly development would impact negatively not only on the future of the Mindanao peace process but much more on the fragile situation existing on the ground.

On August 18, 2008, extremely frustrated by the aborted signing of the MOA-AD; outraged by the nation-wide demonization of the MILF and the Bangsamoro people; provoked by the aggression of the AFP and the armed militias of Vice-Governor Manny Pinol against the MILF forces of the 105th Base Commandunder Ustadz Ameril Ombra Kato in North Cotabato which began as early as July 1; and reacting to the saber-rattling calls by Iligan city mayor Lawrence Cruz and Congressman Varf Belmonte to the Filipino settlers to take up arms against the MOA-AD, the commander of the 102nd Base Command of the MILF, Bravo Macapaar, took the initiative of raiding military and government installations in the coastal municipalities of Kauswagan and Kolambugan in Lanao del Norte.

This fateful event, the raid on Lanao del Norte, opened wide the door to war that has provided just the opportunity and the pretext for the Arroyo regime and the ‘hawks’ in the AFP to turn their backs on the Mindanao peace process and thus resolve the Bangsamoro problem, no longer on the negotiating table but in the field of ard combat.

Indeed, in August 21, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced that a ‘new paradigm’ on the peace process has been adopted by the GRP. Arroyo and her circle of advisers knew that this so-called ‘new paradigm’ whose components, among others, are demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of DDR would be rejected by the MILF and by all revolutionary groups. But that was exactly their aim: for the MILF to reject this new framework and pre-condition for a resumed peace negotiation so that the GRP could justify was as the only option to resolve the Bangsamoro problem.

Following the announcement of Arroyo, the Solicitor General, Agnes Devanadera, speaking in behalf of the Malacanang, publicly and unequivocally declared in August 22 that the GRP was abandoning the MOA-AD and that it would not sign it in its present form or in any other form. This was done while the Supreme Court was still deliberating on the validity of the MOA-AD. Obviously, this move was intended as a signal to the Supreme Court to ‘bury’ the MOA-AD.

With this act of the GRP, the proverbial cat has been let out of the bag. The real agenda of this government and the ruling elite of the Philippine nation-state have finally come to the surface.

Significantly, in August 21, on the same day that Arroyo was announcing her ‘new paradigm’ for the peace negotiation, an initial number of 3,000 troops was deployed in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. The same number was earlier fielded in Maguindanao as the AFP declared that it was launching military operations against what the GRP calls ‘rogue’ MILF commanders—Ustadz Amerial Ombra Kato, Bravo Macapaar, and ALim Pangalian. More troops from Luzon and the Visayas were to follow as the armed confrontation on Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and Sarangani began to intensify and gradually overflow to other Moro provinces.

In September 3, Arroyo finally dissolved the GRP panel negotiating with the MILF. The dissolution of the GRP panel was the last nail in the coffin of the 11 year peace process that produced the MOA-AD.

In the midst of these grim developments, the MILF stood pat on its policy of peaceful negotiated political settlement of the Bangsamoro problem. In contrast with the move of the GRP, the MILF did not disband its negotiating panel and opposed subtle attempts by the GRP to rrplace Malaysia as facilitator to the peacetalks. The MILF also did not fall for the military provocations of the AFP, which has started to expand its aggression against MILF base commands that are not even under the so-called ‘rogue’ commanders. Instead of reacting, the MILF ordered all its field commands to strictly adopt a defensive posture thus belying the allegation of the GRP that it was the MILF that held a gun to the GRP’s head to force the issue of the MOA-AD on the latter. As to how could the MILF do such thing given the fact that the MOA-AD was both crafted and initialed by the MILF and the GRP and that the latter has all the strategic-military advantage on its side defies imagination and the truth.

At present, the war on the ground has expanded beyond the borders of North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur and Sarangani especially after the departure of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in November 30 from Mindanao. Basilan now is up in falmes. Sulu and Tawi-tawi might follow. In all these conflict-affected areas, Moro communities are being bombed to smithereens; innocent men, women and children are dying either in the war zones or in a makeshift refugee centers; and human right are being flagrantly violated by the Philippine state. As of the last count, more than 500,000 refugees have been displaced and are now homeless. The scars of previous wars have not yet fully healed and now new wounds are being inflicted by this conflict that, to the Bangsamoro people, seems to be endless.
After realizing perhaps the folly of its war policy in furtherance of its colonialist interests in the Bangsamoro Homeland, the GRP is now shifting to a different tact without, however abandoning its colonial policy of aggression. The war is going out of control for the GRP and is causing more damage to its faltering economy and is causing irreparable dents on its international image as more innocent people die and more MILF base commands in the different Moro-dominated provinces and areas are compelled to join the fray in the face of the unbridled military aggression of the AFP in the Moro homeland.

Today the GRP is frantically calling for the resumption of the peace negotiation. It is reconstituting its hitherto disbanded negotiating panel and has named Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary Rafael Seguis to chair it. We have nothing against the resumption of the peace talks or against the resumption of the peace talks or against the appointment of Secretary Seguis as new GRP Panel chair.

That is a matter of internal to the GRP. But the questions that are left unanswered by the GRP are: what are we going to talk about at the negotiating table? Are we going to waste another 11 years merely to talk of, say Britney Spears or who’s going to be the next president of the Philippines?

Brother Mohaghir, chair of the MILF negotiating panel, has made it very clear that the only way the MILF is going back to the negotiating table is to resume where we left off in August 5: the signing of the MOA-AD. Short of that would be near to impossible because even if we assume that the MILF leadership agrees to return to the negotiating table minus the MOA-AD, the mujahideen on the ground and the masses of our people would not allow it, and the fighting would escalate and continue to the next generations.

The GRP, indeed, seems to be engaged in a circus act because besides calling for the resumption of negotiations, it is also now proposing a ceasefire this December. Why? Is it because it is the Christmas season? In October, during the month of Ramadhan and Muslims, including the mujahideen, were observing the obligatory fast, Moro civil society groups desperately appealed to the GRP to halt the military offensives in the Moro homeland in deference to this month most sacred to the Muslims. This was flatly rejected by the GRP and the AFP and the most that they could concede was to scale down’ their military operations which merely translated to the minimal use of heavy artillery and aerial bombing of Muslim Moro communities. But even then, this was plain lip service because it was during Ramadhan that many Moro homes in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur were destroyed by the AFP’s relentless artillery and aerial bombardment.

It is not a figment of imagination to state here and now that as the situation develops for the worse, Moro sentiment for independence is again rapidly gaining ground. This is because of the emerging perception among our people that a compromise solution to the conflict between Philippine national sovereignty and territorial integrity on one hand, and the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination on the other, is futile considering the fact that the GRP has reneged on and betrayed its commitment to the very compromise solution it had formulated and crafted with the MILF to settle the Bangsamoro Problem.

This is the reality now facing all of us.

That said, on our part as members of the MILF negotiating panel, the search for options that would give justice to the Bangsamoro people never ends. But, with the intransigence of the GRP and the Filipino ruling elite, we find ourselves today facing no other option and choice but to represent and plead our case before the international community and non-government organizations.

For as matters stand, we cannot negotiate again with a government that could not even fulfill its commitments in peace negotiations let alone defend its own peace panel being pilloried by self-serving politicians and the media before the Philippine public. We cannot negotiate again with a government that speaks with a forked tongue, a government that speaks with its mouth but not with its heart. We cannot negotiate again with the government that does not know the real meaning of peace and to whom the word justice is as alien as the farthest solar system in the universe.

On this note, in behalf of the MMILF, I again congratulate the MPPM for holding this auspicious gathering and whose proposition for attaining peace and justice in our occupied Moro homeland provides us a flicker of hope in this time of adversity

Thank you. Assalaamo ‘alaykom wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuho.

December 14, 2008